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Abstract
Security in Web services technology itself is a complex and
very current issue. When considering the use of this tech-
nology suite to support interacting e-businesses, literature
has shown that the challenge of achieving security becomes
even more elusive. This is particularly true with regard to
achieving a level of security beyond just technologies, that is
trusted, endorsed and practiced by all businesses involved.
In an attempt to address these problems, our research has
previously introduced BOF4WSS [1], a business-oriented
development methodology, specifically geared to guide e-
businesses in defining, and achieving agreed security levels
across collaborating enterprises. As that work was only an
introduction, the aim of this paper is to provide detailed
insight into what exactly BOF4WSS advocates and how these
activities and processes aid in building security and trust.
Keywords: Security, Web services, e-business, systems
development methodology, cross-enterprise interactions
1. Introduction
E-business has become the fastest growing means of
conducting business in today’s economy. In achieving the
online business-to-business (B2B) collaboration between e-
businesses, the use of services-oriented computing, by way
of Web services (WS) technology, is playing an increasingly
significant role [2]. The novel benefit is rooted in its ability
to allow for seamless integration of business processes across
disparate enterprises. This is due to the use of standardized
protocols and open technologies [3]. One author [4] even
states that the facilitation and automation of these business
processes is the ultimate goal of Web services. As WS’ use
expands however, securing these services becomes of utmost
importance.
In an attempt to address new security challenges accompa-
nying WS, standard-setting bodies have proposed numerous
pioneering standards. As WS matures, the move from lower
level security details such as standards and technologies,
to higher level considerations however, is imminent [5].
Security, irrespective of the context, is a multilayered phe-
nomenon encompassing aspects such as practices, processes
and methodologies. This factor is especially true with WS
which, as authors [6] note, substantially complicates the
security environment for e-businesses.
Considering this, and with special appreciation of the
inter-organizational security issue now facing businesses
interacting using WS, in previous work we have introduced
the Business-Oriented Framework for enhancing Web Ser-
vices Security for e-business (BOF4WSS) [1] to address
some of these issues. At its core, this framework supplies
a cross-enterprise development methodology that can be
used by businesses—in a joint manner—to manage the
comprehensive concern that security in the WS environment
has become. Building on the introduction to BOF4WSS
given in that work therefore, this paper presents thorough
coverage of the framework, its ideas, the tasks involved, and
also their justifications.
The remainder of this extended paper is structured as
follows: Section 2 contains a brief review of the security
advancements in WS use for e-business with the aim of
identifying outstanding security issues, and therefore paving
the way for BOF4WSS. Next in Section 3, a detailed
discussion of the framework, including its novelty and use,
is given. Conclusions and future work will be outlined in
Section 4.
2. Web Services Security within e-Business
2.1. State of the Art
Albeit a promising implementation technology for the
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), and an increasingly
used enabler of e-business, WS comes at a high price of
an unstable security foundation. The literature identifies
numerous challenges [5], [7], but the most pertinent for our
research is the reality that WS adds significant complexity
to the e-business security landscape [6]. This complexity
makes security a much broader and comprehensive concern,
which cuts across business lines much easier and quicker
than before. As such, an inadequate security posture in one
company can mean an increased, real-time security risk for
its partners—both immediate and extended.
To address the new security challenges mentioned above,
consortiums such as OASIS and W3C have developed and
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ratified numerous pioneering standards (as can be seen
in [5]). These standards aim to both solve problems caused
by common threats and also to further the WS paradigm
by enabling substantially more dynamic security interactions
between services. Beyond addressing the perceived inade-
quacies of the current standards base, researchers are now
targeting the more general components of a security solution
such as best practices and processes. These actions give life
to a prediction made by NIST, which emphasized that as
WS technology matured, methodologies and recommended
practices for security would become the next step in the goal
of developing secure systems [5].
Some of the most pertinent, and noteworthy proposals
focusing on these higher layers are: [8], which builds on
existing technologies and the theory of Aspect-Oriented
Programming, to provide a framework for securing WS com-
positions (necessary in collaborative e-business) using the
WS-Security and WS-Policy standards; [9] aims to provide
a methodical development approach for constructing security
architectures for WS-based systems; [10] which provides
integrated WS design strategies and best practices for end-
to-end security; [11] – a method that uses fuzzy logic to
measure the risk associated with WS, with full appreciation
of the fact that due to WS’ volatility, information on threats
is usually incomplete or imprecise; and lastly the Event-
driven Framework for Service Oriented Computing in [12]
– a standard agnostic, multilayered framework that aims to
address the problem of defining and enforcing access control
rules for securing services use at the level of business pro-
cesses. In their work, authors particularly focus on dynamic
authorization, independent of specific standards [12].
2.2. Outstanding Security Issues
WS security approaches should aim to be thorough in
planning, developing and maintaining an adequate solution.
Standard security components encompass technologies, but
as recent literature [13] in the study of security in general
has emphasized, it also includes policies, processes, method-
ologies, and best practices. To WS’ detriment however,
this fact does not appear to be unanimously shared as any
attention on these other aspects is being drowned out by
the proliferation of various new technology standards. One
can easily see this fact when comparing the few higher
layer approaches mentioned in [1] to the vast number of
standards and technical systems highlighted in [5]. It may
therefore be very tempting to regard such mechanisms as
the ‘solutions’ to the WS security problem. Whilst the work
of technologists is valuable to building security and trust
however, alone they cannot form the entire solution. In
fact, all these mechanisms address is the technology layer
of security, and the threats which emanate at that level;
thus only providing a stepping-stone in the goal of reliable,
comprehensive, multilayered security. This perspective is
supported by authors in [5] and they identify processes such
as effective risk management, and defence-in-depth through
security engineering, as critical to developing robust, secure
systems.
A final concern regarding standards is that there are
already too many available [14]. Therefore, as opposed to
benefiting WS, this plethora of sometimes overlapping stan-
dards ultimately confuses developers and acts to complicate
secure WS implementation and use. The importance of these
factors is magnified when assessing WS use for the already
complex field of e-business.
To briefly assess the aforementioned research in [8],
[9], [10], [11], these are all seen to successfully comple-
ment available technologies, and provide useful security
approaches. Their main caveat however is that they con-
sider security predominantly from one company’s internal
viewpoint, i.e., what should a company do internally to
secure itself. This highly isolated perspective is inadequate
due to the very nature of WS, and the high degrees of
interconnection between businesses—spanning exposure of
legacy systems to purpose-built Web applications—that WS
readily facilitates. In [12], even though this allows for a
layered, and more comprehensive model for WS security
during business process execution, its predominant focus is
towards access control, and particularly for highly dynamic
environments. Both these aspects act to make it too specific
a framework for our purposes as mentioned before.
Looking beyond these advancements, an intriguing re-
search area which has received little emphasis is at the level
of cross-enterprise interaction (i.e. interactions spanning,
and including collaborating businesses and their internal
systems). Specifically, we refer to providing some compre-
hensive approach to aid businesses in collectively handling
security as the broad, inter-organizational concern it has
become. This approach would not be solely at the technical
level but look generally at a number of other fundamen-
tal aspects (e.g. security directives, policies, government
regulations, best practice security standards, business risk
considerations, and negotiations necessary) that businesses
should jointly consider when developing and engaging in
B2B interactions employing WS. This is particularly with
the knowledge that in WS, lack of security in one business
can very easily mean elevated security risk for a partnering
entity, its systems and its data [6].
The basic notion behind such a proposal can been seen
in the largely exploratory research study done in [15]. In
that article, the authors accepted the comprehensive security
dilemma e-businesses face and proposed a generic model to
enhance security. In many respects our research’s general
proposals are an extension of that exploratory work, to
delve into the intricacies of what would constitute such a
comprehensive security approach.
Further to the previously mentioned goals, this new ap-
proach would also aim towards facilitating the increased
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trust in business partners, their systems, and the overall
service interactions, as an intrinsic objective. The importance
of trust in e-business (with or without WS) is stressed
by several authors [16] and at the risk of oversimplifying
its elusive nature, some of its most salient attributes in
this context are transparency, accountability, predictability,
reliability and benevolence [17], [18]. This approach would
aim to foster trust between partners, their systems (which are
no longer ‘black boxes’ to partners), and the overall service
interactions, by stressing these and related factors.
With regards to security and trust in general, the approach
could be seen to facilitate a level of confidence in services
and partners not obtainable if businesses integrate security
merely at the technology level. Technology-level integration,
even though essential, is only part of the complete security
solution. In discussing the general topic of WS’ usage for
B2B, Alonso et al. [19] note that WS enables “a company
to open its IT infrastructure to external partners” however
it does “not help with the many legal and contractual
issues involved in B2B interactions”. Similarly, technology-
level security integration can be done, but to allow for a
more holistic security solution in B2B—and particularly
in businesses which have cross-enterprise security as a
critical goal—other higher level aspects must be considered.
These aspects go beyond the flashiness of dynamic security
and trust negotiation possible with WS standards, and deal
with a business-level security approach to risks and each
organization’s needs and goals. Typical areas in which cross-
enterprise security might be a such an important goal would
be businesses with substantial and long-term investments.
Also, companies bound to strict contractual or government
regulations that must be enforced. And lastly, businesses
that deal with mission-critical systems, such as the health
or banking sectors.
In summary, there are a number of unaddressed issues
as e-businesses look towards creating, and maintaining a
comprehensive, trustworthy WS security solution. Primarily
these stem from (i) an overly reliant emphasis on technology,
alluding to standards and systems as the complete solution
to WS security, and (ii) an overly isolated security stance,
focusing on the process one company should follow to
secure itself internally, therefore ignoring the comprehensive
security issue introduced by WS use. As was previously
mentioned in Section 1, to address these issues, BOF4WSS
was proposed. The goal of the next section therefore is to
expand on the introduction in [1] and provide an in depth
look at the inner workings and activities in BOF4WSS
3. BOF4WSS
3.1. Overview
To address the outstanding security issues above, and
strengthen available solutions, the Business-Oriented Frame-
work for enhancing Web Services Security for e-business
(BOF4WSS) displayed in Figure 1 was conceived. As is
illustrated, the framework consists of nine stages which in
general, semantically resemble those found in typical sys-
tems development methodologies. Formally these stages are,
Requirements Elicitation, Negotiations, Agreements, Analy-
sis/Architectural, Agreements, Systems Design, Agreements











Figure 1. BOF4WSS Overview
The Waterfall Model (WM) methodology in particular
was the main influence for the framework’s design. This
can be seen when comparing BOF4WSS’s phases to those
of the WM i.e. system feasibility study, requirement analysis
and project planning, system design, detailed design, coding,
testing and integration, installation, and maintenance [20].
The WM was preferred to other methodologies due to
the transparent, well-organized, highly documented, and
strongly disciplined process it can bring to this large inter-
organizational development project [20], [21]. Some prac-
titioners even view the structure possible with the WM as
an ideal fit for the corporate (and somewhat bureaucratic)
world, and a key reason why the WM is here to stay [22].
With appreciation of the flexibility and quick turnaround
benefits of agile and more lightweight methods, these were
also considered at length. These techniques were not chosen
as a foundation however, because literature [23], [24] does
not advise them in situations: (i) of large development
projects; (ii) where development teams might be in different
places and dealing with complicated interactions with other
hardware and software; or (iii) in critical systems develop-
ment. These are all likely situations where BOF4WSS might
be used, as mentioned in previous and also, later sections.
Despite the benefits listed, it is accepted that the WM
is not perfect and does have shortcomings. For example,
researchers have identified that it freezes requirements too
early, lacks flexibility in the original model when travers-
ing stages, and results in excessive documentation [20].
As opposed to adopting a different methodology how-
ever, BOF4WSS addresses these shortcomings by allowing
for flexibility through bottom-up progression and feedback
(shown on the right in Figure 1), and stressing the in-
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volvement of key stakeholders throughout the entire process.
Additionally, even though requirements are determined early
in the framework, these are only high-level requirements (as
opposed to the traditional WM that defines all requirements)
which can, and may change at subsequent stages closer
to design. The inclusion of the Negotiations and various
Agreements stages at the points specified is necessary due
to the inter-organizational process, and the importance of
companies discussing and agreeing on goals.
The prime novelty in BOF4WSS is the emphasis on pro-
viding an expanded formalization of a development method-
ology that focuses on security, which can accommodate
multiple autonomous businesses working together. As will
be seen below, the framework and its phases give detailed
guidance on what should occur and how, and its pertinence
in attaining desired levels of holistic security for these cross-
enterprise interactions. To recap, cross-enterprise interac-
tion security refers to ensuring businesses are secured inter-
nally, but also that the external interactions encompassing
collaborating businesses are secure to some level. External
interactions to a company simply mean interactions that
occur in transit (i.e. while they are being passed between
companies), and to some extent what occurs regarding the
security of these interactions while being processed by busi-
ness partners. This internal and external focus is revisited at
various points in BOF4WSS’s presentation below.
Returning to the point regarding the detailed guidance
given by the framework, this will involve defining the
expected inputs to stages, along with their required out-
puts/outcomes, but especially the recommended low-level
goals, activities, and steps within those stages that can help
achieve the outcomes. Where suitable, this guidance aims to
reuse existing methods and practices—both from industry
and academia—thus concentrating on the compilation of
these into a coherent, well-defined process instead of rein-
venting standardized parts of the proverbial security wheel.
Another main design goal of the framework is to pro-
mote/utilize Web services specifications and tools wherever,
and whenever useful. This is done to provide companies that
adopt BOF4WSS with a practical methodology that pulls
together key WS-specific specifications and tools from the
plethora of technologies available, and shows exactly where
and how they can fit into the development of a Web services
solution. To date, the authors are not aware of such a broad
methodology as BOF4WSS, which aims to fit together some
critical pieces of the WS security puzzle in the context of
cross-enterprise, highly structured, extensible (by allowing
different approaches to be plugged in), business-oriented
framework.
BOF4WSS’s close alignment with Web services, secu-
rity, and cross-enterprise development, differentiate it from
somewhat related, existing frameworks and models such as
TOGAF [25] (a detailed method and a set of supporting
tools for developing an enterprise architecture), SABSA [26]
(a framework for delivering cohesive information security
solutions to enterprises), and the Web services develop-
ment lifecycle [4]. These are all very adequate, de facto
approaches, but aim at a much more generic level than
is of interest in this research. Otherwise, there are various
similarities between these models and BOF4WSS, including
identification and involvement of key stakeholders, definition
of conceptual data models for foreseen interactions, phase
inputs and outputs, and architectural design and technical
level implementations.
To support the largely textual description of the frame-
work’s activities below, a number of diagrams are included
illustrating each stage and its respective workflow. Since
security issues are a central concern to BOF4WSS, the
discussion concentrates primarily on these aspects rather
than an isolated discourse on functional and quality related
aspects. (Quality aspects or requirements in this regard
refer to non-functional requirements excluding security, e.g.
performance, scalability, maintainability, and so on.) At
some stages however, in the interest of completeness, this
paper does attempt to give some guidance on these areas.
This is particularly when they relate to key WS standards
and technologies. Lastly, BOF4WSS assumes that businesses
have previously agreed (through feasibility studies, initial
dialogue, and so on) to use WS to support a generally
defined business scenario. In other words, the broad scenario
is known. BOF4WSS’s task therefore is to provide a method-
ology for its planning, development and implementation.
Below, the framework’s stages are presented.
3.2. Requirements Elicitation Phase
Definition & analysis of existing
(related) business processes
high-level scenario
key process definitions with inputs,
tasks, & outputs
Modelling of envisioned
processes at a high level
process models
Analysis of models (their
inputs, outputs, & tasks) to
allow for determination of
formal requirements
Risk assessment to analyze




requirements, & any supporting
documentation (e.g. processes)



























Gather knowledge about, &
influences to process domain














Figure 2. Workflow model of the Requirements Elicita-
tion phase
The Requirements Elicitation phase is displayed in
Figure 2 and assumes two companies, A and B; more
256
International Journal on Advances in Internet Technology, vol 2 no 4, year 2009, http://www.iariajournals.org/internet_technology/
companies however are possible. Within this first phase, each
company works largely by itself, analyzing internal business
objectives, constraints, security polices, relevant laws and
regulations and so on. This is done to determine their high-
level requirements for the expected WS business scenario.
Typically, a company team should be assembled that would
be responsible for project management, system development,
cross-enterprise communications, and generally steering and
championing the project from inception to fruition.
To aid in the Requirements Elicitation process, the phase
utilizes the methods proposed by [27], which focus on the
definition and analysis of business process models to elicit
requirements (functional, quality, and security-specific). This
approach is preferred as it is a tested technique that also
has an innate emphasis on business processes—i.e. the
culmination of service interactions. During these methods, as
with some of the subsequent stages, the framework heavily
stresses the involvement of stakeholders, and especially
top management buy-in (i.e. support). Validated by studies
in [28], these are critical success factors in managing and
developing information systems.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the approach in [27] consists
of firstly gathering relevant knowledge about the process
domain and what influences it. This information could
include business objectives, legal or system-specific con-
straints, existing process models, system architectures, and
so on. The second task is the analysis and modelling of
current processes (particularly if existing models are not
accurate) to enable for a full appreciation of critical process
flows, and their inputs and outputs. This will primarily
focus on internal and external processes directly involved
in envisioned WS interactions, and those that are candi-
dates for redesign. Legacy applications are an important
consideration at this point because these are likely to supply
critical functionality in the foreseen scenario. These systems
will therefore have to be thoroughly understood, and their
business functionality/logic rationalized and defined. This
is particularly useful in the next task as legacy applications
functions are packaged, modelled and included in envisioned
processes.
Crucial persons (i.e. stakeholders) of reference for the
information mentioned will be top executives, domain ex-
perts, project managers, systems analysts and end users.
For the modelling activity in this second task, the Unified
Modeling Language (UML) is suggested for use as it is a
standard technique likely to be known by both enterprises.
If companies are entering a process they have not done
before (i.e. there are no ‘current processes’ specifically
related to the envisioned interactions), this task will not be
as relevant. Instead, the aim will be to consider how their
internal processes will integrate with this newly envisioned
interactions.
The third task is the modelling of new processes. At this
point, the needs of new business interactions (driven by
the companies and at the core, the stakeholders) result in
new processes, but often also include enhanced, and updated
existing processes. Legacy systems deserve special emphasis
because if they are to be included in new processes, they
can be either re-engineered (reimplemented), repurposed
(changing interface and encapsulating some business logic),
or partitioned and packaged into deployable functional com-
ponents [29]. The choice between these methods will largely
be dependent on benefit versus cost, and whether legacy
systems can adequately fulfill new business goals.
Generally, the processes defined in this task are expected
to be high-level, and mainly cover internal (i.e. known)
as opposed to external (i.e. envisioned) operations. This
however may not always be the case, for example, if the
external processes with the other company are known due to
prior transactions, businesses may be able to develop initial
medium-level process flows which encompass the external
interactions. In either case, occasional communications with
business partners is required to enable useful processes to
be defined. Also, again UML is suggested for (i) the reason
above, and particularly because these high-level models can
be used to aid in discussions in the Negotiations Phase, and
(ii) the fact that it adequately enables for high- or medium-
level processes to be defined.
The last task in the approach proposed in [27] is the actual
requirements determination. This is accomplished through
analysis of the newly defined process models. By assessing
the inputs, outputs, and tasks involved, general requirements
(functional and quality-based) for each stage of the process
can be defined at a high level. For quality requirements in
particular it is understood that these may be hard to state
this early, and at this rather high level, but businesses should
make an effort to give some idea of their desires for system
quality. To elicit security-specific requirements, the authors
mainly analyze the access restrictions of the actors (users
or applications) on the processes, and process inputs and
outputs. In these last two stages, BOF4WSS heavily involves
the previously highlighted stakeholders.
In addition to the security requirements identified above,
a scenario risk assessment is strongly suggested to pro-
vide more detailed and extensive security information. This
assessment, as opposed to the one above which focuses
primarily on access restrictions in processes, enables for a
comprehensive, security-driven analysis of the scenario. The
assessment is strongly suggested primarily to combat the
unfortunate reality that a significant number of businesses
simply do not carry out formal security risk assessments to
identify key risks faced [30]. Or, if companies do engage
in risk assessments, studies show that major gaps in risk as-
sessment coverage often are apparent that could result in sig-
nificant risks being overlooked [31]. To aid in this process,
there are a range of assessment methods. BOF4WSS sug-
gests well-documented, and internationally validated, time-
tested techniques such as NIST Special Publication 800-
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30: Risk Management Guide [32], OCTAVE (Operationally
Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) [33],
and CORAS (Construct a platform for Risk Analysis of
Security Critical Systems) [34].
Generally, some of the crucial factors considered in a
chosen technique should include risks (constituted of assets,
threats, vulnerabilities) and their priority levels (i.e. severity
and impact if risks materialize), organizational security poli-
cies (which directly convey a company’s security posture),
pertinent laws and regulations (those governing internal
operations, and those with respect to working with external
parties), security budgets (balancing cost and security is
paramount), and security needs expected to be met by
new business partners. All of these factors significantly
aid in the determination of the security that should be
factored in during these envisioned WS communications.
These requirements should particularly address areas that (i)
need additional security internally (and relate to the overall
scenario), and (ii) relate to the interactions with the business
partner. After these requirements have been gathered, they
are added to the previously identified requirements, and
documented to provide the stage’s output—i.e. a high-to-
medium level scenario process (inclusive of the models
defined), high-level requirements (functional, quality and
security), and any other the supporting information.
3.3. Negotiations Phase
In the Negotiations phase next, teams consisting of
project managers, business and systems analysts, domain
experts, and IT security professionals from the companies
meet, bringing together their requirements from the previous
phase for discussion and negotiations. Figure 3 displays the
workflow. The purpose is to use the inputs to this stage as
a basis to chart an agreed path forward in terms of sce-
nario and business requirements, and high-to-medium level
process definitions. This is especially noting the varying
A & B A & Bs requirements
Discussion & negotiations on
functional and quality
requirements
Discussion & negotiations on
security requirements. May




agreed high-to-medium level requirements & envisioned
















& other unique needs
Figure 3. Workflow model of the Negotiations phase
expectations each company is likely to have towards security.
Expectations (and requirements) could vary with regards to
whether a process (or set of service interactions) needs to be
secured, to what level is it to be secured, how will security
be applied, and so on. Specifically the two main tasks in
this phase therefore are: Discussion and negotiation on (i)
functional and quality requirements, and then (ii) security
actions and requirements. Depending on the preferences of
businesses using the framework, the latter of these tasks may
include a joint risk analysis aimed at identifying any risks
(and thus requirements) not conceived previously. Delibera-
tions on statutory and regulatory requirements are especially
important when discussing security, as businesses may not
be in the same industry or even, country. Where necessary,
as is seen in the workflow, backward progression from
the security requirements definitions to functional/quality
requirement definitions is allowed. This is mainly to support
balancing between functional/quality and security actions
and requirements.
The Negotiations phase facilitates its purpose by accepting
that each business constitutes a different security domain
(and is likely to have different desires and obligations),
and therefore explicitly stresses the need to negotiate on
security actions, rather than adopting one company’s needs,
or assuming integration of desires at this level will be
seamless. Work in [35] clearly highlights that in forming
these extended networks or partnerships of companies, this
integration task is formidable. Regardless however, this is a
necessary, and pivotal precursor to engaging in interactions.
After the identified tasks have been completed, the expected
output of this stage will be the agreed high-to-medium level
requirements, high-to-medium level envisioned processes,
and any business rules/logic and constraints, important for
future stages.
3.4. Agreements Phase
A & B agreed requirements
Businesses restate mutual scenario goals
Definition of high-level security directives in
the form of policies, procedures & best practices





requirements, envisioned processes, business rules/














Legal contract drafting &
signing by A & B (optional)






Figure 4. Workflow model of the Agreements phase
The Agreements phase depicted in Figure 4 builds on
the concluded negotiations and initially advocates a legal
contract to solidify the understanding of the requirements
between companies thus far. A legal agreement at this
point is not compulsory however, as it is appreciated that
businesses may choose to include the contract at another
stage, or to have only one main contract at a later stage when
details of interactions are finalized. The reason the contract
is suggested here is to create a safety net for both companies
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during these early stages of planning and negotiations. The
contract would focus on two main aspects, binding the
parties to negotiations for possibly future business interac-
tions in good faith (non-disclosure agreements may be used
for example), and secondly, defining the groundwork for a
more comprehensive contract to follow in later stages. The
agreement and definition of requirements in the Negotiations
phase makes the latter of these tasks (i.e. defining the
groundwork) less complex and arduous.
This legal document is followed by the Interaction Se-
curity Strategy (ISS) which, as opposed to the contract, is
a less rigid management structure that defines high-level,
cross-enterprise security directives to guide the interactions
and relevant security decisions internal to companies. These
directives are typically in the form of security strategies,
policies, procedures, best practices, and objectives. Figure 4
shows that the central activities in this stage are: (i) the
restating of the businesses’ mutual goals for the scenario—
this will provide a clear vision for the strategy; and (ii)
the actual definition of the security strategy’s directives. In
addition to the use of requirements, and business constraints,
when defining these directives, the framework emphasizes
consideration of two aspects, i.e. the legal and regulatory
mandates which may influence companies and interactions,
and secondly the best practice security standards available
from industry. These are discussed below.
In business today, legal and regulatory requirements per-
taining to security are becoming increasingly important. This
is especially within the arena of online business. These
mandatory requirements cover topics such as data protec-
tion, data privacy, computer misuse, incident disclosure and
notification, third-party auditing, and even security within
business relationships. The aim of the ISS with regards to
these requirements is mainly to stress that businesses make
themselves aware of the content of these laws and regula-
tions. This is not only to fulfill the statutory need, but also
because a number of these laws stress principles of good,
reliable security that should be practiced by businesses.
Some of the most relevant laws businesses should consider
include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (U.S.)—this
emphasizes the maintenance of adequate internal controls
to ensure the accuracy of financial information [10], [36];
Health Insurance Privacy and Portability Act (HIPAA) of
1996 (U.S.)—focuses on confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability of personal data (medical or personal records) ensur-
ing it is protected whilst in storage, and during transmission,
both within and external to the company [36]; Data Pro-
tection Directive 95/46/EC of 1995 (E.U.)—this is targeted
towards personal data, ensuring that it is adequate, accurate,
and processed lawfully, amongst other things [10]; and
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) of 1999 (U.S.)—mainly
aimed at financial institutions, this act stresses activities such
as the evaluation of IT environments to understand their
security risks, establishment of security policies to assess
and control risks, and the scrutiny of business relationships
to ensure partners have adequate security in place [36].
Knowledge of, and adherence to these regulations is critical
as companies look to conduct business in an increasingly
regulated marketplace.
In addition to promoting the compliance to legal and
regulatory requirements, the ISS emphasizes the incorpo-
ration of best practice security standards in the approaches
by companies towards inter-organizational security. Whilst it
may be tempting to assume that businesses already accom-
modate such standards, recent surveys [30] have shown that
companies are largely not aware of key security guidelines.
The ISO/IEC 27000 series is a perfect example of important
standards, and as Figure 4 shows, they form a key input
into this stage. This standards set in particular, is targeted at
the provision of an internationally recognized, organization
independent framework for effective, extensive information
security management [37]. Themes addressed include the
definition of essentials (in terms of specifying information
security policies, conducting in-depth risk assessments, and
so on) for the creation of an adequate information security
management system (formally, the ISMS)—this is covered in
ISO/IEC 27001:2005; a code of recommended best practices
for planning and implementing the ISMS—see ISO/IEC
27002:2005; and detailed guidelines for the information
security risk management process to support the ISMS—
see ISO/IEC 27005 [37]. The creation and maintenance of a
well-conceived, and thorough internal security management
system for an organization is the fundamental objective of
this standards set.
To put the ISS directives (e.g. laws, standards, and
policies) into context, Figure 5 is included below. This
illustration, based on work in [38], shows how each aspect
covered by the ISS fits in to provide a layered model for the
e-business security environment.






Figure 5. The e-business security environment (based
on [38])
Looking directly at the ISS’ emphasis on standards during
this Agreements phase, there are countless benefits. As men-
tioned prior, the term cross-enterprise interactions denote
interactions spanning, and including collaborating businesses
and their internal systems. Therefore, securing the internals
of businesses which participate in these interactions is also
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a crucial goal—this is especially where the ISO/IEC 27000
standards set is useful. Two specific benefits of applying
these standards are that they provide organizations with a
systematic way of fulfilling legal and regulatory responsi-
bilities (for example, some standards can help meet SOX
requirements), and secondly, through accreditation schemes,
businesses which can demonstrate adherence to guidelines,
can be issued with a certificate to show customers and
business partners that their systems and practices are secure
to an international standard [37].
At the external level these standards also prove useful
as certain clauses (e.g. ISO/IEC 27001, Control A.6.2) deal
specially with external parties, and attempting to maintain
the security of an organization’s information assets as they
are accessed, processed, communicated to, or managed by
external parties [37]. The two main tasks involved in this
attempt are the identification, and addressing of risks directly
related to external parties; these are two activities that were
completed to some extent during the risk assessment in
the preceding Requirements Elicitation phase. Reflecting on
Control A.6.2 therefore, as opposed to resulting in an ex-
haustive legal contract (as is suggested by the Control), any
new risks and their respective controls which were identified,
would feed into the cross-enterprise security directives for
the ISS.
Having discussed the ISS, its goals and its main influ-
ences, a brief look is taken at some examples of what the
ISS could cover. The first example is the specification of
best practices each company should abide by internally.
One best practice might be related to ensuring companies
maintain sufficient logs of system events; this information
would be very useful in cases of a security breach. Another
example of an aspect the ISS would address would be the
definition of scenario incident response activities i.e. what
procedures should companies follow if a security incident is
suspected, or has occurred. The third, and somewhat general
example relates to the responsibilities, and expectations of
companies towards security. The ISS would enable com-
panies to almost always have some clear vision of what
their partners should be doing, (likely stated in terms of
policies, and procedures) relating to aspects of security. The
final example is the creation of a small, cross-enterprise
team specifically to handle security matters, and updating the
ISS and other security measures as, and when appropriate.
Here, the ISS recognizes and appreciates that security is an
ongoing concern. Therefore, it calls for a team to be formed
constituting of persons from both enterprises to manage this
concern. In essence, the ISS forces businesses engaging in
joint interactions to consider and address security issues,
both internally and externally, that previously may have been
overlooked due to overly simplistic, or isolated approaches
towards security.
By jointly creating an ISS companies can have some
degree of certainty that partners are committed to maintain-
ing an acceptable security posture. This leads to another
central goal of this strategy, i.e. to foster trust amongst
business partners. The ISS aims to foster trust through
predictability and transparency in security approaches, by
outlining a security strategy and subsequent framework that
all businesses agreed to adopt and follow. Trust within
e-business was outlined before (see Section 2.2), and its
importance should not be neglected. This paper does note
other, more direct methods to assess a business partner’s
commitment to security, such as audits, on-site visits, and
questionnaires (as suggested in [36]), but leaves this choice
to individual organizations that adopt BOF4WSS. Within
very closely-knit and highly collaborative relationships (such
as the e-supply chains) however, audits amongst other
precautionary mechanisms are strongly recommended; this
opinion is supported by [39]. The closer businesses are,
the more likely they are to be affected by each other’s
security risks. Businesses should be mindful of this factor
as they seek to work with other enterprises. To complete
this Agreements phase the following documents and infor-
mation are prepared to be carried forward to the next stage;
these are the high-to-medium level requirements, high-to-
medium level envisioned processes, any business rules and
constraints, and cross-enterprise security directives in the
form of strategies, policies, procedures, best practices, and
security objectives (or more formally the ISS).
3.5. Analysis/Architectural Phase
A & B business rules/constraints,
functional requirements
Identifying and agreeing on where security
directives might be applied to secure models
Application of security directives to process
models either using (i) generic security







medium-level process models with security objectives
applied (i.e. a candidate security architecture), medium-
























Identifying and agreeing on
process modelling technique
Figure 6. Workflow model of the Analysis/Architectural
phase
Following on from agreements, next is the Analy-
sis/Architectural phase. The workflow of this stage is given
in Figure 6. This phase’s purpose to enable companies
to take the agreed requirements, and define conceptual
(medium-level) business process models for the foreseen
interactions. These models are expected to encompass not
only the high-level company-to-company process flow, but
each company’s internal process flows that constitute part of
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the general business scenario. Internal process definition and
sharing is encouraged to cultivate an atmosphere of openness
between the companies, but especially to make companies
properly analyze the expected internal flows and how they
fit into the general scenario. At this point, it is still relatively
easy for companies to make any necessary updates. With this
in place, the directives (policies, best practices, and so on)
from the ISS can then be applied to secure the models. This
two-stage method to securing business processes is adopted
from research done in [40], which focused on decomposing
processes into flows with inputs and outputs, then applying
derived security objectives (these are encompassed in our
security directives) to secure process components. [41] is
an example of other work which adopts a similar, stepped
approach to secure e-business processes during design.
To define the medium-level business process models
needed, various standard modelling techniques are available
(see [29], [42], [43]). Some of the most popular of these
are UML (inclusive of its many specialized profiles), Data
Flow Diagrams (DFD), Integration Definition for Function
Modeling (IDEF) techniques (e.g. IDEF0, IDEF1x, IDEF3),
and the Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN). The
UML 2.0 extension for SOA, UML4SOA [44], is a recent
proposal from research groups which also provides an in-
teresting technique. This profile however appears to be only
targeted at service orchestration (i.e. internal, as opposed to
cross-enterprise systems). Yet another option is the UML
profile in [45] for Web service composition. This could be
very useful because a main design goal is the inclusion of
transformation rules that allow designed UML models to be
transformed to Web service compositions that are executable
(e.g. BPEL, albeit an older version)—a necessary task in
future stages.
Having mentioned the SOA, the framework notes that
businesses may or may not model processes in terms of
services at this point. The notion of a service here refers to
its abstract meaning i.e. distinct units of logic [46]. This is
therefore the conceptual prerequisite to actual technology-
based Web services. If modelling in terms of abstract
services, businesses for example might start defining func-
tionality or processes to package together to form referable
units of logic. If initial modelling in previous phases define
components to encapsulate legacy system functionality, these
could be starting points to regard as services. The benefits
of service modelling at this point, is that it could give
early insight to where services are likely to fit in, and
secondly, that it forces businesses to view processes in terms
of services early on. If a company is looking towards full
adoption of an SOA framework internally, the latter of these
benefits is more crucial.
Although services modelling is an option, there is ar-
guably no need for companies to rush into the services
creation task as yet. This is because the forthcoming Design
phase which covers a lower level of analysis, addresses this
concern in detail. As with many other parts of BOF4WSS
however, the final decision is left up to businesses and
what suits their ideology and situation best. For the more
standardized techniques above, [47] provides a brief outline
of the software and tools available to support modelling. The
importance of tools cannot be stressed enough, as these are
critical in streamlining and easing the modelling process for
companies.
Since it is almost certain that companies would have
engaged in process modelling at some point before, they are
likely to have preferred techniques; because of this, first an
agreement is required on the technique that they will use.
As can be concluded from Figure 6, the framework does
not stipulate that any particular method be used. It however
does advice businesses to carefully deliberate the benefits,
and shortcomings of the options available. Any assessment
should bear in mind: (i) the goal of this phase i.e. defini-
tion of secured medium-level process models; (ii) the fact
that these models will have to be further decomposed and
used to express varying aspects (e.g. security or scheduling
constraints) at lower level, and therefore having standard
ways to state these aspects may be beneficial; and (iii) the
impending need to translate (with, or without tool support)
these process models into more WS-specific formats, for

























Figure 7. Options for modelling security with UML and
BPMN
businesses for example might find it useful to know that
firstly, there have been proposed extensions to UML to
account for security, and secondly, with highly esteemed
options like UML and BPMN, there are mechanisms publi-
cized that can translate these medium-level models to WS-
specific languages, as will be seen in subsequent sections.
Figure 7 is one guide that can be supplied to companies
to give a summary view of UML and BPMN with respect
to the options for modelling security. Information on UML
profile for QoS and FT, Security requirement with a UML
2.0 profile, and Extension for the Modeling of Security
Requirements can be found in [48], [49], [50] respectively.
Researchers in [42] and [43] have investigated into the nu-
ances of a number of popular process modelling techniques,
and their findings would be a first point of reference (used by
BOF4WSS) to guide companies in choosing a method. The
first article provides a taxonomy of modelling techniques to
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assist decision makers in evaluating and selecting a suitable
option based on the project, and/or the specific purpose
for modelling [42]. Purposes could range from functional
(task-focused) to informational (data flow-based), or from
process development to simply enabling for understanding
and communication. The second article is a more recent
review of the techniques for modelling and culminates in
a detailed summary of these approaches (covering their
attributes, characteristics, strengths and weaknesses), and a
framework classifying them according to their purposes [43].
For more on BPMN and UML4SOA, see [29] and [44]
respectively. All of the information on these techniques from
resources identified above can be used by businesses to aid
in the selection of the most appropriate process modelling
approach to suit their specific organizations and needs.
Once the modelling technique has been agreed, Figure 6
shows that businesses then proceed to use the phase’s inputs
to define and model the cross-enterprise processes. During
this task, companies should be wary of the temptation to
prematurely define the processes in great detail. Even though
it is understood that this is the next step (i.e. the Design
Phase), and that for some security objectives low-level anal-
ysis is ideal, agreeing on and defining a conceptual model
is a critical base step to the following stages. This degree of
modelling enables visualization and description of process
at an abstract but holistic level, which is comprehensible
by all members of the companies’ teams, as opposed to
only systems designers or software developers. Conceptual
process definition can allow companies to analyze processes,
weigh alternatives, and assess process inter-relations. Most
importantly however, it enables the achievement of agree-
ment on the vision for the medium-level architecture and
process flow, in and across enterprises prior to low-level
design.
Identifying and agreeing on where security
directives might be applied to secure models
Application of security directives to process
models either using (i) generic security
objectives or (ii) targeted security patterns
medium-level process models with security objectives
applied (i.e. a candidate security architecture), medium-






















Figure 8. Identification and application of directives in
the Analysis/Architectural phase
After defining the cross-enterprise process models, the
next general task presented in Figure 8 is to apply the
security directives. Due to the range of directives, and the
variety of possibilities in which they could be applied to
even these medium-level models, businesses are faced with
a complex undertaking. Initially therefore, the framework
suggests that companies focus on identifying and agreeing
on where security directives might, and should be applied to
secure the models. A detailed table is one simple way that
companies could match security directives to the processes
they will affect. The framework accepts that not all directives
may be process-specific or -related (for e.g. monthly updates
on ISS). When the matching has been completed, there are
two methods in which directives can be actually applied
to the process models, these are either (i) through the use
of generic security objectives (as done in [40]) or (ii) by
employing targeted security patterns (see [10]). These two
methods are preferred in BOF4WSS because they provide
decent security procedures which are generic enough to be
applied, even if only by way of annotations, to a number
of the aforementioned modelling techniques. Figure 9 dia-















Figure 9. Process from security directives to security
architecture
To use the first approach (i.e. [40]) in its original form,
companies will have to ensure that process-related security
directives are stated with regard to the security objectives
of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability.
This however is not a limitation, because the framework
does appreciate and support the desire of businesses to add
other, possibly relevant objectives that reflect the directives.
These additions might include objectives on nonrepudiation,
authentication, and authorization for example. After this
is complete, individual process components (i.e. inputs,
outputs, activities, and actors—users of process activities)
are assigned rating values (for e.g. High, Medium, Low)
in terms of these objectives. These values indicate level of
security desired for the component, and should be based on
previous risk analysis findings and the security directives, as
opposed to being just randomly chosen. The following gives
an example of an assignment; if a data value α is output
from an activity, and the risk analysis or security directives
dictate that α is very sensitive data and its confidentiality
is likely to be threatened, companies might assign process
component α with a confidentiality rating of High. This type
of assignment activity is done for all process components in
the previously defined models.
The second approach is the application of security pat-
terns to secure the process models [10]. Formally, “a security
pattern describes a particular recurring security problem
that arises in specific contexts and presents a well-proven,
generic scheme for its solution” [51]. Simply, it can be
thought of as a well-proven, generic solution to a recurring
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security problem. An immediate benefit of employing this
approach therefore is that it would utilize catalogues of
proven and tested security patterns to address the require-
ments in the security directives. This accounts for the
input of the security pattern catalogues to this stage as
shown in Figure 8. Authors in [10] have investigated this
topic in detail, and have provided an extensive listing of
existing and new patterns spanning the Web, Business, Web
services, and Infrastructure and Quality of Services tiers of
a typical company’s systems. Using the example of data
value α from the previous approach above, personnel at
companies would check through the security catalogues for
an appropriate pattern to protect α. Having identified suitable
alternatives, these would then be noted for formal analysis
and application during the subsequent Design Phase. The
goal at this Architectural stage therefore (as illustrated in
Figure 9 and also done in [10]) is mainly the identification
of relevant security patterns.
To briefly compare the security objectives [40] and se-
curity patterns [10] methods, the first approach is likely to
be more time consuming, as applying priorities for the se-
curity objectives to each process component is a substantial
task. Conversely, two benefits accompanying this method
are, the simplicity of use and application, and secondly,
that it naturally enables for the security priorities (e.g.
High, Medium, Low) to be associated with the specific
components. The latter of these tasks is not inherently
accommodated in the security pattern concept, albeit easy to
add in some cases. If companies chose to use patterns, the
advantages include, having their security problems addressed
in a structured way, and also the ability of non-security
experts to reference and apply proven security solutions
(through the use of pattern catalogues) to solve otherwise
overly complex problems [51]. An additional benefit of
using the pattern catalogue in [10] specifically is that it
largely is geared towards Web services interactions and is
thus equipped with standards and technologies that can be
used to implement the pattern in later stages. Regardless of
the method chosen, the Architectural stage’s output should
be medium-level process models with security directives
applied (formally, this constitutes the candidate security ar-
chitecture), the medium-level requirements (functional, and
security-specific) accompanying these models, and the inputs
passed into this phase.
3.6. Agreements Phase
Following the formal conceptual process definition, the
framework suggests the use of another Agreements phase.
The respective workflow can be viewed in Figure 10. At
this point, the agreement is in the form of a more thorough
legal contract reflecting detailed expectations of the parties
included in the envisaged business scenario. The business
rules and constraints, functional requirements, and security
A & B business rules/constraints, medium-
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Figure 10. Workflow model of the Agreements phase
requirements all factor into this contract. The medium-level
requirements are especially important as they provide further
detail on the agreed interactions. During contract drafting,
it is accepted that requirements may change, and therefore
any updates made are fed back into the known requirements
and process models. Again, this legal document is used
primarily as a safety net (in the event that companies have
an irreconcilable disagreement and need formal arbitration),
and therefore still relinquishes the role of governing day-
to-day interactions to the ISS. Many authors [17], [26]
support this and similar views, and highlight a number of
drawbacks to using contracts as the sole basis for conducting
business. The outputs of this phase are the medium-level
process models with security directives applied (formally,
this constitutes the candidate security architecture), the up-
dated medium-level requirements (functional, and security-
specific) accompanying these models, the business rules and
constraints, and any other the inputs passed into this phase.
3.7. Systems Design Phase
The Design phase next is analogous to a company’s inter-
nal systems design process (for e.g. see [10]) and therefore
targets the definition of a low-level (or logical) systems-
related view of exactly how the conceptual model from the
Architectural phase will be put in place. In Figure 11 the
specific tasks in this stage are presented diagrammatically.
As is shown, the first activity is for the teams from each
business to jointly define the low-level process models.
The framework advises businesses to reuse the modelling
technique chosen before (in the Architectural phase) but on
this iteration, to break down the medium-level models to
the lowest level of detail. The goal is to decompose models
such that the individual message flows between companies
can be seen, and also the specific tasks which constitute each
process activity. In defining these low-level interactions, it
is critical for company teams to identify the actual services,
and define the interactions in terms of these services. Work
in [46] is one commendable reference that examines moving
from business processes to service models and designs,
which also provides thorough guidance. Generally however,
businesses should be attempting to identify aspects of func-
tionality within processes that could form distinct logic units.
To exemplify this task, Figure 12 is used.
This diagram shows a simplified medium-level process
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Figure 12. An example of moving from processes to
services
flow of a typical order processing scenario (on the left),
and next to it (on the right) the services that were deduced
from it. In identifying services, special attention was paid
to subprocesses that could be somewhat independent, and
could be grouped and encapsulated with related tasks. The
purchase order service is a good example of this as it
encapsulates the ‘place order’ and ‘receive confirmation’
subprocesses into one unit of functionality that can be
referenced.
Depending on how open companies have chosen to be
with how their processes (or systems) will work internally,
the low-level process definition purported might be primarily
of the interactions between companies, or the interactions
between and also within the businesses. To use Figure 12
to explain this point, the former of these tasks refers mainly
to the arrows connecting the Buyer and Supplier, whereas
the latter refers to those arrows plus the arrows and flows
within companies. Even though the ultimate degree of open-
ness maintained by companies throughout the framework’s
activities is largely left to the individual teams, BOF4WSS
stresses that openness and transparency could foster trust
between these companies. This trust will be a key ingredient
to successful future business interactions.
Building on the low-level process definitions, Figure 11
shows that the following task is the application of WS
process specification technologies, to state these low-level
definitions in terms of WS-level interactions (expressing
them in terms of Web services wherever appropriate). This
transformation task is made much easier once the low-
level processes have been stated to resemble services. WS
should be viewed as the Internet-based implementation
technology that will implement designed services. At this
point, expressing the interactions from a global perspective
(i.e. showing interactions between companies rather than
internal process flows) is desired as it allows for the creation
of a contract that defines a jointly agreed set of order-
ings and constraint rules whereby WS message exchanges
can take place [52]. To facilitate the expression of this
global services contract, the framework suggests one of
two options, either (i) the use of W3C’s Web Services
Choreography Description Language (WS-CDL)—WS-CDL
provides a standard mechanism for defining WS collabo-
rations, and choreographies of message exchanges from a
global viewpoint [52]; or (ii) BPEL4Chor—a recent proposal
from the research community built on Business Process
Execution Language (BPEL), that aims to address a number
of perceived shortcomings of WS-CDL [53], [54]. These
approaches were chosen specially because of their suitability
for WS, and ability to produce formal, Web service-level
process specifications that could feed into future framework
phases. ebXML’s Business Process Specification Schema
(BPSS) is another popular option that can specify business
transactions and their choreography [29]; this method is not
preferred because of BOF4WSS’s aim to primely utilize
WS-specific technologies.
In deciding whether to use WS-CDL or BPEL4Chor, the
framework highlights the following factors for consideration
by businesses. This paragraph assesses WS-CDL and the
next, BPEL4Chor. In terms of politics in the standards world,
WS-CDL is likely to have more support from industry be-
cause it is under the charter of the W3C. (Notably however, a
concise research survey in [55] provides a counter-argument
to this assumption as they state that interest in this spec-
ification has dwindled.) A second advantage of WS-CDL
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is that, from the WS-CDL document defined, companies
are largely able to generate BPEL workflow templates for
their internal process flows, that reflect the global business
agreement [4], [56]. Third, because WS-CDL leaves actual
implementation decisions and details to companies, it allows
them the flexibility to use preferred internal technologies. A
high-level example is given in [52], where one company
may use BPEL engines to drive workflow whilst another
uses a more traditional J2EETMsolution. Another factor
regarding WS-CDL is that if companies had chosen to use
the UML Profile for Schedulability, Performance, and Time
Specification [57] to model processes in the Architectural
phase, research work in [58] has investigated a method
for translating those models into WS-CDL documents. This
could therefore be plugged in, and used by companies
to automate document creation. Lastly, there is some (al-
beit very limited) tool support targeted at providing users
with the ability to produce, view, simulate, and validate
WS-CDL choreographies—namely WS-CDL Eclipse [59],
Pi4SOA [60] and LTSA WS-Engineer [61]. These could be
employed by companies to assist in creating and testing the
WS-CDL definitions.
At its core, the second approach i.e. BPEL4Chor, defines
extensions to BPEL to enable the definition of choreogra-
phies [53]. In light of this close association, BPEL4Chor can
be seen to be specially suited for situations where businesses
will desire subsequent BPEL workflow specifications for
their internal process flows. The ability to allow for a
seamless transition between choreographies (in BPEL4Chor)
and orchestrations (in BPEL) is actually one of the main
advantages this approach has over WS-CDL (when consid-
ering moving from WS-CDL to BPEL workflows) according
to its proponents [53]. A second noteworthy factor is that if
businesses have used BPMN to model processes in previous
stages, research in [54] describes how these BPMN models
can be reused, and largely transformed to BPEL4Chor. A
plug-in for an available graphical modelling environment is
also proposed to aid in this transformation. [53] should be
referenced for more nuances of this approach as compared to
WS-CDL. In summary, WS-CDL and BPEL4Chor are both
viable solutions for Web service-level process specification.
With the information provided above, companies can chose
their technologies of preference.
Along with the low-level process definition shown in
Figure 11, harmonization of process and data semantics
across companies is critical. In this paper however, this
activity is not covered as it would necessitate an extensive
discussion that digresses considerably from the overall focus
on security. For information, some of the main aims during
this stage would be tackling the semantic interoperability
problem at both the data and business process levels. This
problem, as it relates to the B2B context, is discussed in
detail in [4]. Addressing these issues would likely include
the use of tools such as ontologies, shared vocabularies,
metadata repositories, and depending on companies’, also
technologies such as Semantic Web Services, ebXML pro-
cess definitions, and RosettaNet’s Partner Interface Processes
(details of each, available in [4]).
process models, low-level functional
requirements, a semantics
framework




Figure 13. Definition of quality requirements task in the
Systems Design phase
Following the definition of processes and harmonization
of semantics, the goal switches to the determination of
the quality requirements at these lower levels. For ease of
reference Figure 13 illustrates the task. In earlier stages,
quality requirements were produced at a high level and
these form the base for the actions here. For this task,
businesses, especially their analyst and systems designers
play central roles. Business teams need to decide details
such as availability (or uptime) of systems and services,
acceptable latency levels, performance expectations by par-
ties, and more general aspects including usability, scalability,
and even maintainability of envisioned systems. [62] has
compiled an appropriate listing of WS quality of service
attributes that can be used as a starting point by teams. It
is important that these requirements and their relation to
processes be well thought through because they constitute
prime factors against which the security design will have
to be balanced. Businesses can either mainly discuss and
agree on these quality requirements, or if a more “hands
on” approach is preferred, use available techniques to specify
requirements. UML for example has a profile for modelling
quality of service characteristics (see [48]) that can be used.
Analyze trade-offs between adoption of security
objectives/patterns & the functional and quality
requirements for interactions
Application of security objectives/patterns to
low-level process models
process designs, low-level requirements, security





















Figure 14. Security analysis and application tasks in
the Systems Design phase
The next step in BOF4WSS (an excerpt is shown in
Figure 14) returns the focus to security and aims to finalize
the security architecture and build the security design. The
first task in fulfilling this aim is analyzing the trade-offs
between the adoption of security objectives/patterns and the
low-level functional and quality requirements from prior
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tasks. Cost, where possible, should be generally factored
in by business teams as it pertains to adopting the security
directives, remembering that these will translate into security
mechanisms and technologies later. Systems designers and
security professionals with knowledge of this area can aid
significantly in this task. Work in [26] yields a perfect
example of the hard task faced by businesses in attempting
to balance these often conflicting objectives. Abstracting to
the three basic, conflicting aspects, namely security (i.e. a
security requirements), cost (i.e. a general limitation) and
usability (i.e. a quality requirement), the author states, “To
obtain higher security . . . will cost more. To increase security
often impacts upon usability, and visa versa” [26]. Another
brief example is a company’s use of three security patterns
to ensure the integrity of messages passed between it and
its business partners. From a security perspective, this is
ideal (the more security the better), but from a performance
perspective, it is unlikely to be accepted because excessive
security will undoubtedly negatively affect processing time.
Looking at the security objectives method, even though
businesses may desire to have every message secured to the
highest priority level in terms of confidentiality and integrity,
financially, this may simply not be realistic noting cost of
certificates, software and so on. These are the types of factors
to be assessed in this step.
Once the analysis is complete, the viable security ob-
jectives/patterns are then applied to the low-level process
models to fashion the business process designs. Figure 14
covers this task. In the Architectural phase, security objec-
tives have already been applied therefore if businesses have
utilized this method, the task now is to break down the
secured medium-level processes, and associate the objectives
with lower-level process components (from the low-level
models above). For example, as opposed to specifying a
confidentiality objective of ‘High’ on all outputs from one
activity (or task or system) to another (as was likely done
in the Architectural phase), businesses should consider the
individual messages output and whether they all need the
‘High’ confidentiality rating. The messages should be visible
from low-level process models, therefore the ideal situation
would be to take the low-level models, and modify them
to show the new, specific levels of security required for all
process components.
For the application of viable security patterns, depending
on the modelling technique chosen, patterns can be eas-
ily woven into the low-level process models. Companies
will first need to gather the associations made between
the medium-level processes and security patterns from the
Architectural phase. Then, using the associations, teams can
begin to link low-level processes (from which the medium-
level processes were defined) to the relevant security pat-
terns. This is followed by the actual application of patterns to
models either conceptually (by way of detailed annotations),
or logically (within the formal models). Even though some
techniques may prove more efficient at this application
task, the conceptual solution that security patterns provide
should enable a relatively manageable task for the security
professionals on the teams. To give an example of possible
output, a snippet of a UML process model with patterns
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Figure 15. UML process model with patterns applied
In this UML sequence diagram, three security patterns
have been applied to protect order-related communica-
tions/messages between systems at Company A and Com-
pany B. These are (i) secure pipe—for securing a basic
connection between trading parties; (ii) message interceptor
gateway—a central location to manage security enforcement
tasks; and last (iii) message inspector—this is responsible for
the verification and validation of the security elements in
the data or message delivered. These patterns were sourced
from [10], and more examples of their use and application
can be gathered from that reference.
Due to its versatility and extensibility, UML again forms
one of the better techniques for the modelling task. In
Figure 7, it was shown that for simple modelling, sequence
or activity diagrams are useful; an example of which is seen
above. To facilitate detailed modelling, one suggested option
is the UML profile for security, quality and fault tolerance
requirements. This profile is defined in [48] and provides a
standard mechanism for expressing security. Another note-
worthy option still within the structured confines of UML
can be found in [49]. This research work supplies a UML
profile specifically for secured business process modelling
using activity diagrams. Security aspects accommodated
include auditing, and security requirements such as integrity,
attack detection, non-repudiation, access control and privacy.
UMLsec [63] and SecureUML [64] are two additional, more
detailed security-related extensions to UML that might also
be of interest to businesses.
With regards to BPMN, the inclusion of security as-
pects in models is much less researched and standardized
when compared to advances in UML. Authors in [50] state
that BPMN “does not explicitly consider mechanisms to
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represent the security requirements”. Because of this fact,
BOF4WSS primarily suggests annotations to models and
detailed supporting documentation when engaged in simple
modelling. Detailed modelling as highlighted in Figure 7 can
be partially addressed by recent research work—see [50]. In
that article, researchers recognize the need to have the ca-
pability to include security in models, and therefore develop
an extension to BPMN for modelling security requirements
in business process. Albeit not fully complete, this work
provides an invaluable start for companies in moving from
detailed notes to formal, standards-based models. The caveat
to adopting this approach however is its newness. This
means that there may be changes or updates in future
security modelling notations (thus the possible need to
reconstruct process models), and also that it lacks tool
support (the need for tools to streamline and ease process
modelling should not be overlooked). For all of the other
modelling techniques, where no special accommodation is
made for modelling security actions or requirements, the
framework advocates annotating the models and making
detailed supporting documentation. This is not ideal because
requirements are not directly and practically applied to mod-
els however, it should provide teams with enough relevant
information to proceed.
process designs, low-level requirements, security
architecture design, semantics framework
low-level process designs, service-level interaction
definitions, security architecture design, semantics
framework, standards/technologies to implement
interactions, & security and quality requirements
Identifying & agreeing on the standards and
technologies to implement interactions,
especially security and quality requirements
Consider best practices & vulnerabilities in
context of WS and standards/technologies
standards & technologies
Figure 16. WS standards agreement and assessment
tasks in the Systems Design phase
The penultimate task in the Design phase depicted by
Figure 16, is identifying and agreeing on the standards
that will be used to implement the services, and especially
the security and quality-of-service (QoS) requirements. In
general, even though WS is one of the leading interop-
erability technologies today, basic tasks such as agreeing
on standards (within WS) is still crucial to a successful
deployment. Authors in [14] allude to this fact as they
discuss the “What’s missing” in Web services technology.
The main interoperability problems they identified stem from
the existence of too many standards (over sixty already),
the tweaking of standards by individual companies, and the
numerous versions of even the basic WS standards [14].
Authors accept that WS-Interoperability (WS-I) [65] profiles
can address some of these problems, however they note that
this is only possible if companies make their Web services
compatible to the WS-I profiles. Their work provides just
one example of the importance of the agreement on the
standards to be used by businesses.
In this task, systems analysts and designers knowledgeable
in the intricacies of WS technologies should take the lead
at this point. Whereas analyst help to provide the bridge
between the previous works (requirements, low-level pro-
cesses, and so on), designers look at service and technology
details. Due to the extensive number of technologies avail-
able and the frequent updates made, instead of covering
the standards within the framework, BOF4WSS provides
companies with key information sources which they can
reference. Sources range from published texts [4], [10], [19],
[66] for introductory- and intermediate-level material, to
the actual standards Web sites i.e. W3C, OASIS, Liberty
Alliance Project and WS-I, for up-to-date, definitive infor-
mation.
To identify security standards, the work of [10] is partic-
ularly relevant if companies have used their security pattern
catalogue in previous stages in the framework. The reason
for this is because within their catalogue, also supplied is
a list of standards and technologies that can implement the
respective patterns. For example, to implement the message
inspector pattern mentioned above and shown in Figure 15,
[10] suggests options of XML Encryption, XML Signature,
SAML and XKMS to name a few. Information on these
and other security standards and technologies can be found
in NIST guidelines such as [5]. One of this article’s core
purposes is to provide companies with “practical, real-world
guidance on current and emerging standards applicable to
Web services” [5]. Briefly touching the topic of standards
and technologies for QoS requirements, this area is less
developed. Companies however can find some information
in articles such as [67]. This covers a number of WS QoS
aspects, mentions standards which are used to implement
them, and also discusses techniques to improve Web service
quality.
A final short point companies should be mindful of during
the identification and selection of standards is the tool sup-
port available to actually use the standards in a production
environment. If there is an absence of tools, regardless of
the benefits of standards proposed, these standards cannot
be used. Common reasons for little, or no tool support
include newly developed/ratified standards (i.e. they lack
maturity), and rejection of standards from key tool provider
companies such as Microsoft Corporation (with .NET), or
Sun Microsystems Inc. (with J2EE).
Having agreed to some degree on the standards and
technologies to be employed, BOF4WSS (see Figure 16)
advises companies to consider (i) the common vulnerabilities
and pitfalls in WS and the mechanisms chosen, and (ii)
the best practices in using the WS standards/tools, and
implementing them as securely as possible. Both of these
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factors may have been analyzed in some respects before, but
because of their significance and the complexities regarding
technologies themselves, it is reiterated here. As done above
with standards and technologies in the previous task, because
of the large number of vulnerabilities and range of best
practices, BOF4WSS references more complete and detailed
sources rather than listing them. For the first factor i.e. com-
mon vulnerabilities and pitfalls in WS, two prime sources
are documents from organizations such as NIST (see [5])
and WS-I (see [68]). These give information on common
attacks, risks, and typical security challenges.
For the second task in Figure 16, namely the consideration
of best practices in using standards and dealing with the
various security challenges, the following articles provide
designers and developers with some useful techniques. [5]
provides general guidance in addressing threats and on se-
cure implementation tools and technologies. [10] gives vari-
ous best practices and design strategies. [68] identifies typi-
cal countermeasures (technologies and protocols) to mitigate
common WS threats. Finally, [69] lists techniques to protect
against more threats to WS. In light of the vulnerabilities
and best practices discussed, BOF4WSS gives companies
the option of revisiting the preceding task to reassess the
standards and technologies chosen. This progression can be
seen in Figure 16, and is highlighted because depending
on vulnerabilities or best practices, teams may often opt to
use different, more robust standards, or technologies with
extensive guidance (practices) on their use. This completes
the Design phase and the expected outputs are low-level pro-
cess designs, service-level interaction definitions, security
architecture design, a semantics framework, the standards
and technologies of choice to implement the WS interactions,
and the low-level requirements (functional, security and
quality).
3.8. Agreements (for QoS) Phase
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Figure 17. Workflow model of the Agreements (for QoS)
phase
With the low-level process designs, and service-level
interactions defined, the Agreements phase concentrates
on the agreements necessary at the quality-of-service (QoS)
level. During the task shown in Figure 17, the goal is to
specify the mutual understanding of the priorities, respon-
sibilities, and guarantees expected by each business with
respect to the other entity, regarding the actual Web services.
This phase directly extends work on quality requirements in
the Design phase, and in the end, results in a set of formal
and contractual agreements. As done before, QoS require-
ments typically assessed include service availability needs
(e.g. a service uptime of 99.98%), performance requirements
(e.g. average response time of 30 milliseconds), and so on.
Besides quality requirements, process designs and service
interactions are necessary for input because they too need to
be considered in defining appropriate QoS levels for services
and systems.
To specify the QoS requirements agreed, businesses have
a few alternatives. The first and most common option is
a contractual, natural language agreement referred to as a
Service-Level Agreement or SLA. SLAs date back to many
years before WS, and since their inception have proved very
useful mechanisms to define levels of service in a measur-
able way (to allow for monitoring), and also the penalties
where agreed levels are not fulfilled. For WS, SLAs will
have the same usage and general mode of application. The
only difference may occur in how services are monitored,
as more WS-specific tools and techniques are likely to be
employed which enable increased granularity and efficiency
in monitoring. For more details on SLAs and what can be
included in a WS context, companies can reference [4].
Another option proposed by the research community
in [70] is to make use of accepted policy standards such as
WS-Policy to specify a service’s quality requirements. This
method however is ideally suited for dynamic interactions
where quality requirements greatly influence the services,
or service providers chosen for use. The last noteworthy
approach is the Web Services Level Agreement (WSLA)
framework described in [71]. Broadly, this framework allows
for the specification and monitoring of SLAs for WS.
It enables service users and providers (i.e. companies in
BOF4WSS context) to define a variety of SLAs, specify
the SLA parameters (e.g. availability, response time) and
the method for their measurement, and finally relate them
to implementation systems. Implementations of the WSLA
framework have been built and are available for use in some
IBM products—see [72]. Once the specification of the QoS
requirements of each company for services is complete, the
outputs of the phase to be made ready are QoS agreements,
low-level process designs, service-level interaction defini-
tions, security architecture design, a semantics framework,
the standards and technologies of choice to implement the
WS interactions, and the updated low-level requirements
(functional, security and quality).
3.9. Development and Testing Phase
As with most methodologies, the penultimate stage in
BOF4WSS is the Development and Testing phase. Having
discussed how services and systems would interact in a
cross-enterprise context, this phase (shown in Figure 18)
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Figure 18. Workflow model of the Development and
Testing phase
is centered on the actual development, implementation,
deployment and testing of services and systems at the
companies. Because of this factor, it is mainly carried out
by companies individually, with each company working
on their own systems development. Occasional, or even
prolonged joint interactions are however greatly appreciated
especially for services testing, updates, troubleshooting and
systems verification to the requirements established in pre-
vious framework phases. All the inputs to this phase are
to be used by companies and their development teams to
steer the internal systems implementation. It is stressed that
even though Testing is presented last (i.e. after discussing
Development), companies may choose to do some testing as
services and systems are developed.
Unlike some of the previous tasks covered by BOF4WSS,
activities for the development stage appear to be somewhat
well-established in literature and practice. This is consistent
with this paper’s argument regarding the significant focus
on technology-based and -oriented solutions (which are
dominant during this phase). The benefit of this to the
framework is that there are a variety of tested development
processes, techniques and tools that can be plugged in
during this framework phase. As a result, this phase is
much less strictly prescribed, with Figure 18 mentioning
only three very generic tasks (Planning, Development and
Implementation, and Testing) which are not structured in
detail like prior tasks. BOF4WSS’s aim at this pointer
therefore, becomes the identification of relevant, mature
and largely complete development processes, techniques
and tools that can be employed, and allowing companies
the freedom to combine them to best suit their respective
situations. Two such processes which are instrumental in
aiding in this internal process are [4], [9].
In the former work, [4] presents a WS lifecycle method-
ology that concentrates on critical internal aspects. These
include application integration, packaging legacy applica-
tions into reusable components, migration from old to new
WS-based processes, and the ‘best-fit’ ways of implemen-
tation which appreciate company constraints, risks, costs,
and returns on investment. This methodology is cyclic (as
opposed to linear) and consists of nine stages, namely Plan-
ning, Analysis, Design, Construction, Testing, Provisioning,
Deployment, Execution, and Monitoring. This process is
one of the most appropriate and comprehensive within the
literature for SOA-based deployment. It covers from initial
analysis of internal systems, to the construction and final
installation or deployment of services.
A caveat to the lifecycle methodology however, is its
lack of emphasis on security concerns—a prime target and
goal within BOF4WSS. To compensate for this shortcom-
ing, the framework additionally suggests the integration of
PWSSec [9]—a detailed development process for secure
Web services. The novelty behind this process is (i) its
appreciation of the complex task faced by businesses as
they attempt to make use of WS, (ii) the highly structured,
methodical approach to constructing a security architecture
for WS systems, and (iii) the emphasis on traceability and
reusability which translates into the establishment and use of
a number of repositories and record stores. The three phases
in PWSSec are, Web Services Security Requirements, Web
Services Security Architecture, and Web Services Security
Technologies. These work together to enable the develop-
ment of secure WS systems. In brief, another general point
of reference to supplement the two already mentioned can
be found in [73]. This text provides some useful guidelines
that can be applied within the planning task, related to the
planning and staffing a WS development project.
Probably the biggest benefit of using the processes listed
above is that almost all of the information gathered and
produced earlier in the framework can be reused to quickly
complete their initial stages. Such information includes func-
tional, security and QoS requirements, risk assessment data,
and business process models. If we consider the Analysis
phase in [4] for example, in BOF4WSS’s Requirements
Elicitation and Architectural phases, companies have already
worked on the current and envisioned (or “to-be” processes).
Regarding the Design phase (in [4]) and the specification of
business processes (looking towards WS-CDL and BPEL),
BOF4WSS’s Architectural and Systems Design phases have
previously defined business processes to even these lower
levels. Even though the framework’s focus was on WS-
CDL (and BPEL4Chor), these process definitions can be
converted to the BPEL advocated in [4]. For the more
security-specific PWSSec [9], the medium- and low-level
security requirements, and security patterns identified from
BOF4WSS can be reused in PWSSec’s Requirements and
Architectural stages. [9] also uses UML and the profile
for security ([48]) for some of its modelling; one would
recall that this is a method supported in BOF4WSS. These
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are just a few concise examples of how the outputs from
BOF4WSS’s previous stages can be reused in these pro-
cesses.
In addition to the identified processes, as mentioned
above, literature has supplied a number of techniques and
tools to help in this internal development task. An area in
particular which has received great focus is the automated
creation of BPEL processes from theoretical modelling
techniques (e.g. UML, BPMN). To recap, BPEL allows
for the specification of business process behaviour based
on Web services. Amongst other things, it is an execution
language which can be run by software engines to orches-
trate message, control and data flows. If companies have
modelled process in UML or BPMN therefore, techniques
such as [45], [74], [75] that offer some aid in translating
these models to executable processes (in BPEL) are quite
ideal. Specifically, [74] works with the translation of BPMN
models to BPEL definitions, whereas [45], [75] aim at
transforming their UML variants and extensions (which may
be have been used by companies) to their respective BPEL
process representations.
A critical activity in the Development phase is the im-
plementation of the security standards and technologies
that have been agreed. Implementation includes the actual
application of standards and security levels to the services
and systems, but also the correct configuration of the security
mechanisms employed. Even though output from the previ-
ous phases gives a clear outline of security and where, and to
some extent how it is to be applied, noting the peculiarities
of WS (e.g. service policy specifications, federated security),
this task is still far from trivial.
Researching security configurations for WS, [76] high-
lights the difficulty in this task and the usability problem
faced by developers regarding choosing cryptographic algo-
rithms, encryption keys and so on. To aid in this activity
therefore, they propose a tool to fill the gap between
business-level security requirements and the lower-level,
concrete, technology-specific policies implementing them.
This GUI tool, called the WS-Policy Organizer (WSPO),
enables users to partially create a platform-specific WS-
SecurityPolicy document from a somewhat high-level pro-
cess definition, through the use of a number of preset
security patterns. The integration of this tool within the
framework should be reasonably simple because the process
scenarios necessary are available from previous BOF4WSS
stages, and secondly, the preset security patterns used can
easily be matched to the security objectives and patterns
from the Architectural and Design phases.
Before moving on, it is worth explicitly stating the im-
portance of including tools for monitoring, both the QoS
levels defined in the SLAs, and the security implementa-
tions for their reliability and robustness. QoS monitoring
constitutes the main focus of the Monitoring stage in the
WS lifecycle methodology from [4]. Companies that use that
methodology therefore can receive more information on it
there. Regarding security monitoring, the key is to install
softwares to maintain adequate logs, audit trails and records
that can be referred to as required. Authors in [10] highlight
that having these audit trails has even become a requirement
of some laws e.g. SOX. Intrusion detection, or prevention
software may also be of interest to businesses. Fortunately,
some of the softwares mentioned are implementations of
typical, higher-level security patterns, and therefore are very
likely to be included in developed systems.
The final task within this phase is the testing of the
developed Web services and systems. This is done to verify
that the developed applications meet the intended require-
ments. It can, and should be done at a cross-enterprise
level (i.e. both internally, and externally, across companies).
Testing can occur from three main perspectives; functional
(do Web services do what they should), quality (are the set
performance, usability, scalability, etc. requirements met),
and security (is there adequate protection in place for Web
services and systems). Guidance on testing the functional
and quality requirements is given in lifecycle methodol-
ogy [4] mentioned before. A much more complex operation
is testing the security of the applications developed. Whereas
one can pass input data into a system or process and
(based on the output) quickly determine whether a functional
requirement has been met, security is not that absolute nor
can it be so easily measured [26]. Conversely, this however
does not mean that testing is impossible, or should it be
viewed as a task to be avoided by businesses.
Like approaches for the other testing perspectives, the
initial activities are the same i.e. identify requirements (these
may be in terms of needs, goals, threats that should be
handled), and carry out controlled tests to see if, or how well
requirements have been addressed. For testing the security
of the implemented WS, [77] offers a number of strategies
and guidelines. These are both generic (i.e. just highlight
the use of test suits, test patterns and so on), and targeted
(i.e. focus on specifics such as testing application data).
Vulnerability analysis is another aspect that needs to be
addressed in detail during testing. For this task, companies
can refer to [78] regarding various guidelines on software
vulnerability analysis for WS. These include checking for
cross-site scripting, services traversal, DoS attacks, and
access validation attacks. Actually, businesses can reuse the
original listing of threats that were factored into security
requirements determination, and conduct penetration tests
against services to evaluate how well the implemented se-
curity addresses these threats. Particularly keen companies,
or businesses that lack the expertise internally may consider
employing security companies to conduct these tests. This
decision however, should not be taken lightly as exposing
systems to external parties demands great amounts of trust.
Processes, guidelines, and techniques are all essential in
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testing, but to enhance or at least ease this task, tool support
would be ideal. Unfortunately, there has not been much
notable work in this area as yet; this is likely because WS
testing is a discipline still in its infancy [77]. One tool that
has surfaced (and been referenced in academia [69] for its
use) however, is wsChess [79]. WsChess is described by its
makers as a freely available toolkit for WS assessments and
defense [79]. Authors in [69] give a brief example of how
wsChess can be used to probe for vulnerabilities and formu-
late attacks against Web services. To assess Web applications
that may constitute part of the WS systems, a number of
tools are available. [80] is a perfect source of information on
these tools and an objective discussion of their aims. These
industry-based researchers also outline a taxonomy of tools
which encompass prime testing areas such as source-code
analyzers, Web application scanners, runtime analysis tools,
and configuration management tools, to assist companies
with their tool selection [80]. The tools and techniques
supplied here and those available from other sources should
be used wherever possible to enable for a thorough, adequate
testing of the developed Web services systems. This testing
activity completes the Development and Testing phase; the
outputs of this phase are the developed services and systems,
low-level process designs, service-level interaction defini-
tions, security architecture design, a semantics framework,
the standards and technologies of choice to implement the
WS interactions, and the low-level requirements (functional,
security and QoS agreements).
3.10. Maintenance Phase
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Figure 19. Workflow model of the Maintenance phase
Having developed this comprehensive, multilayered secu-
rity solution, its upkeep becomes the next crucial undertak-
ing. BOF4WSS addresses this and other typical monitoring
and preservation tasks in the Maintenance phase shown by
Figure 19. It is important to understand that this phase is a
continuous one (unlike the others which have clearly defined
endpoints), and will last for the lifetime of the implemented
systems. Specifically, this stage will involve continuous
functional and quality-based system enhancements, but addi-
tionally will stress the continued updating and enforcement
of security measures, both in developed systems and the
overarching ISS. To facilitate the required maintenance
activities, the framework strongly suggests that businesses
form cross-enterprise maintenance and monitoring teams.
Ideally, the majority of the persons chosen should be mem-
bers of the teams that participated in the full BOF4WSS
process. The advantage of this is the experience they bring
and the avoidance of having to deal with too steep of a
learning curve. One team already mentioned in BOF4WSS
is the security team from the first agreements stage. These
personnel are entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring
the internal and external environments, and considering new
threats, laws, and security requirements, and how these will
be included in system and WS interactions updates.
When considering the updating activities of the Mainte-
nance phase, companies must be extremely careful in how
they make changes and updates to cross-enterprise agree-
ments, directives, and systems. This is true even when these
updates are agreed by both companies involved. Changes
should not be made in isolation without first analyzing what
effects they might have on other system aspects, and whether
respective updates to these other aspects would be necessary.
It is for this reason that a smaller scale BOF4WSS process
is suggested in this phase (see Figure 19). By reiterating
this process for new needs in the form of updates and
changes, it allows modifications to be made in a structured
and controlled context. Repetition of previous phases is not
uncommon during software maintenance as noted in [23].
Because the BOF4WSS process has been discussed in detail
previously, it is not covered here or in Figure 19. Instead,
Figure 19 is used to display some of the key new inputs (i.e.
in addition to the ones outlined in previous phases) which
are very likely to be incurred. Examples are, changes in the
business policies (reflecting possibly new goals, aims), new
regulations (therefore new, mandatory security for interac-
tions and systems), new threats and vulnerabilities (these
need to be assessed and addressed), and new techniques and
tools (these may facilitate easier development or even system
testing).
The other tasks depicted by Figure 19 focus on monitoring
in general, but specifically as it relates to (i) QoS levels, and
(ii) the monitoring and enforcement of the ISS and imple-
mented security measures. In the first task, the goal is to take
the actual service levels (recorded by management, auditing
or tracking software added in the Development phase) and
compare them with the SLAs and QoS agreements made
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earlier, to determine if quality requirements are being met
by parties. Particularly of interest to companies will be
aspects that affect general Web service performance levels
such as service response times, and system downtime and
latency. SLAs also are the point of reference that dictates
the penalties and options for recourse if the agreed levels
are not fulfilled.
The second task deals with the monitoring and enforce-
ment of the ISS and the security measures implemented.
Security, in every regard, is a constant process. Authors
in [37] when they describe information security liken it to a
journey, not a destination. Within this journey, monitoring of
the implemented security mechanisms and rules is critical.
The reason for this is that new threats may surface, new
attacks might be launched, and consequently, there needs to
be constant monitoring to detect (and initiate a reaction to)
these advances. Again, the output (e.g. audit trails, logs)
from monitoring and detection softwares is used in this
activity. Beyond tracking new threats, and attacks, it is im-
perative that companies use this information to identify areas
where directives and measures may need to be enforced. This
relates to both internal and external to a company. Therefore,
in addition to monitoring and following up on internal
security concerns, business partners should be periodically
assessed to ensure that they are maintaining the agreed levels
of security. These levels can be found in the ISS, and systems
design documentation amongst other documents. Some of
the common options to assess the security posture of partners
has been covered before (in the first agreements phase) and
includes audits (by a third party possibly), and on-site visits.
A final noteworthy aspect shown in Figure 19, is that
as smaller scale BOF4WSS processes are conducted to
accommodate for updates, the final updates are then re-input
into the respective monitoring tasks. This is done to keep the
information used for monitoring as up-to-date and relevant
as possible. This last task concludes the BOF4WSS process.
Next, a brief summary and justification of BOF4WSS is
presented. That section also identifies the main target group
of businesses for which the framework is intended.
3.11. Summarizing BOF4WSS
As can be seen from the preceding in-depth discussion
of BOF4WSS, the framework provides a detailed guidance
model for inter-organizational cooperation. Beyond this, the
next aim in this research (discussed in Section 4) is to
drill down into the framework’s specifics and provide a
practical implementation base. This includes investigation
into how stages of the architecture can be expanded, when
or where can existing mechanisms be used, and lastly in the
provision of suitable infrastructure and tool support to aid
in framework use.
Reflecting on BOF4WSS in its entirety, specially with
regard to its use by companies, it is obvious that this is
not a process to be taken flippantly. In the design of this
framework, not only were security practices within WS and
business processes in general assessed, but also literature
on joint business ventures such as the extended enterprise
(e.g. [17]), and how security—beyond the technical layer—is
reached, and maintained across enterprises there. With these
factors in mind, the framework is thus aimed particularly
towards businesses that emphasize trust and medium-to-
high levels of security, and expect long-term interactions as
opposed to the short-term, highly dynamic, e-marketplace-
type interactions also possible with WS. Ideally, a set of
business partners in the early planning stages for a WS
project will adopt BOF4WSS to create an agreed, communi-
cations security infrastructure. Due to the long-term nature
envisioned, it is not expected that companies will frequently
enter or leave the business scenario, therefore scalability is
not a critical issue. Should companies be added however,
it is crucial that they go through some of BOF4WSS’s
phases. At that point, it will be up to existing businesses
whether the new partners adopt the active security charters
and infrastructure, or if they all recomplete key security-
related framework phases.
In general, the framework tasks to be executed when new
partners join will be very context dependent. For example,
depending on the new company and its purpose, additional
services may need to be created by all companies, or only
a small subset of companies. The extent of the services
necessary, or the companies that are required to make
modifications to their systems, will then determine the level
of systems development that is required using BOF4WSS.
There may even be cases where new partners already have
their systems exposed as services, and therefore technical
integration is not a problem (therefore no need for in-
depth emphasis on later framework phases). In situations
like these however, existing companies may choose to more
focus on initial phases of BOF4WSS i.e. identifying risks
and negotiating on security actions, and then ensuring that
companies share the same goals with regards to cross-
enterprise security. The ISS would be very relevant in this
regard.
To utilize this approach, companies will have to be pre-
pared to work together and devote resources—financial and
nonfinancial (e.g. time, skills, experience)—to this venture.
Many changes in how the businesses worked before WS
adoption will be necessary. However as stated in [66] con-
cerning WS in general, “the potential benefits—both finan-
cial and strategic—to adopting Web services are sufficiently
large to justify such [business] changes.” The same fact is
true when focusing on security specifically.
Another crucial factor supporting the highly involved ap-
proach to security central to BOF4WSS, is the emerging leg-
islative requirement-base. These regulations (partially shown
in [10]) demand that companies now look both internal and
external (i.e. business relationships) in their considerations
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of security. In [6], authors commenting on the new security
responsibilities in WS, state that “risks must be assessed
and managed across a collection of organizations, which is
a new and very challenging security responsibility”. They
also make the point that to ensure collective WS offerings
between businesses are secure, elements such as strategies
and structured approaches to security must be used [6]. All
these requirements fuel the need for a security approach such
as BOF4WSS.
3.12. Limitations
There are two known, noteworthy limitations of the
framework. The first relates to the longevity of BOF4WSS
and the perspective that it risks being outdated quickly.
This is because BOF4WSS is arguably not as abstract
as a framework/methodology should be. Therefore, even
though identifying standards, laws, tools and technologies is
beneficial as gives e-businesses detailed guidance and insight
into online WS interactions, it ties the framework too closely
with current practices. This is a valid concern and the only
solution to it that is in line with the original aim of the
framework is to update BOF4WSS periodically. This would
allow updates in relevant laws, tools and so on, and also
enable any structural changes to be made based on field tests
and adopting companies’ feedback. Updating frameworks
(and even more abstract frameworks) is an accepted reality
as is exemplified in the various versions of the industry
accepted model, TOGAF [25]—currently up to version 9.
Furthermore, considering the volatility of the online security
field, the updating of all security-focused models is vital.
The second limitation results from the framework’s basis
on the Waterfall Model (WM). Even though this model
is believed to be the most suitable (for reasons identified
above), there are reservations about the time taken for
overall project completion, and flexibility and turnaround
time within individual phases. Possible ways to address these
issues include attempting to incorporate quicker and more
flexible development techniques within specific phases of
the WM-based framework. Additional benefits with these
techniques might also be attainable in the areas of project
risk management (common with iterative methods), and
purpose-built support tools (apparent in methods such as
rational unified process). Hines et al. [81] provide a good
start for this with regards to integrating agile methods in the
WM. Such techniques will need to be evaluated in depth
before being included in BOF4WSS however, to ensure that
structure and benefits of the WM to large or critical system
projects are not affected.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we extended the work in [1] by engaging
in a detailed discussion of our cross-enterprise development
methodology, BOF4WSS. This discussion included a step-
by-step analysis of its nine phases, where we presented the
activities involved, justified the guidance given, and high-
lighted how the activities proposed could aid in building the
requisite security and trust across collaborating e-businesses.
Throughout this work, our main contention was that because
of the very nature of Web services technology, the security of
interacting e-businesses was now a much broader, and more
‘real-time’ issue than ever before. The broad issue was as
a result of the ease in which threats and attacks by way
of WS, could propagate from poorly secured companies to
the systems of their unsuspecting business partners. Whereas
the ‘real-time’ issue refers to the speed in which attacks can
spread between interacting companies.
The novelty of our approach is that it considers the
full nature of WS, and its security implications (techni-
cal and otherwise); recognizes and targets the ‘live’ inter-
organizational security issue now faced by interacting e-
businesses; and finally, promotes the use of a joint ap-
proach, where businesses work closely together and follow
a structured process, to achieve enhanced levels of security
and trust across partners. Our approach therefore aims to
be a facilitator of, instead of a panacea to the security
of e-businesses which use WS. Similarly, the goal is to
provide another important piece of the security puzzle that
is complementary to existing approaches.
In future work, the first area of interest is the provisioning
of systems support for the framework itself. As can be
seen, BOF4WSS is a quite extensive process. To aid in its
use therefore, we intend to further examine each stage and
the interface between stages, and provide support wherever
applicable. One area already identified (through an initial
exploratory investigation), concerns the outputs the indi-
vidual Requirements Elicitation phase and their immediate
usefulness as inputs to the joint Negotiations phase. This
is of interest because of the inherent difficulty (relating to
security actions/requirements format, prioritization schemes,
and so on) in attempting to quickly and easily compare, and
negotiate on the high-level security actions/requirements of
each business as they are passed from the Requirements
Elicitation, to Negotiations phases. To address this issue
we are currently investigating into a tool-based approach
to streamline security actions/requirements comparison and
negotiations. The first steps in our work can be seen in [82],
[83].
Once the framework with added systems support is com-
plete, our next goal will be its evaluation to determine
how well BOF4WSS’s aims of enhancing security and trust
across businesses, have been achieved. Noting the com-
plexity and scope of the framework, the evaluation process
necessary is far from trivial. In an attempt at a thorough
evaluation which appreciates these difficulties, a three-stage
process is planned.
First, industry-based security professionals would be inter-
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viewed to get their views on the suitability, and application
of the framework. This stage provides useful and quick
feedback from a variety of experienced and expert sources,
on the framework and the activities it proposes. The next
stage adopts a more practical perspective and focuses an
evaluation of the systems support developed, to ascertain
the actual degree of support supplied to the framework; spe-
cific scenarios are envisioned for use, which test numerous
aspects of tool support. Initial work in this area can be seen
in [84].
The last stage would be the full application of BOF4WSS
to a real-life case scenario to critically evaluate its suitability
and strength in achieving its goals. This would involve en-
gaging a small set of companies to use the framework in their
business scenario, then monitoring them, and constructing a
case study from the observations, difficulties, uses and so on.
The case could then be analyzed in-depth to make inferences
on the applicability and effectiveness of the framework in
real-world scenarios. This three-stage process would enable
key aspects of BOF4WSS to be evaluated and substantiated
conclusions made on its proposals.
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